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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In the  last decade,  the  phenomenon  of  empathy  has  received  widespread  attention  by the  ﬁeld  of  social
neuroscience.  This  has  provided  fresh  insights  for theoretical  models  of  empathy,  and  substantially  inﬂu-
enced  the academic  and  public  conceptions  about  this  complex  social  skill.  The  present  paper  highlights
three  key issues  which  are  often  linked  to  empathy,  but which  at the  same time  might obscure  our  under-
standing  of it. These  issues  are:  (1)  shared  neural  activations  and  whether  these  can  be  interpreted  as
evidence  for  simulation  accounts  of  empathy;  (2)  the  causal  link  of  empathy  to  our presumed  mirror  neu-
ron system;  and  (3)  the  question  whether  increasing  empathy  will result  in  better  moral  decisions  andeywords:
mpathy
orality
irror neurons
ocial neuroscience
behaviors.  The  aim  of  our  review  is to provide  the  basis  for critically  evaluating  our current  understanding
of  empathy,  and  its public  reception,  and  to inspire  new  research  directions.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an open  access  article  under  the CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).imulation
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ave fascinated scholars from various ﬁelds and laymen for cen-
uries. Only recently, the ﬁeld of Social Neuroscience has begun
o shed light on the neural underpinnings of this phenomenon.
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If one were to trace back the “birthday” of the social neuroscience
of empathy, one would certainly end up at the seminal fMRI study
by Singer and colleagues (Singer et al., 2004) which showed that
experiencing pain and empathizing with the pain of others evoke
overlapping neural activations in cingulate and insular cortices.
This study not only attracted enormous public and scientiﬁc inter-
est (with over 1200 citations by peer-reviewed ISI-listed journals,
at the time of writing this article), but also helped to jumpstart the
ﬁeld of social neuroscience, which was then still in its infancy but
now has become one of the most thriving ﬁelds of neuroscientiﬁc
ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
1 oscien
i
c
D
2
a
t
u
o
f
2
p
e
g
a
K
L
c
t
O
t
c
l
h
c
p
m
n
o
a
(
c
m
1
s
a
i
i
o
r
a
w
v
b
b
q
e
s
v
2
e
r
u
e
a
e
e
o
t
d
t6 C. Lamm, J. Majdandzˇic´ / Neur
nquiry. Since this publication, about 10 years ago (and the publi-
ation of other equally inﬂuential papers around the same time:
ecety and Jackson, 2004; Jackson et al., 2005; Morrison et al.,
004; Preston and de Waal, 2002; Wicker et al., 2003) we  have seen
 tremendous increase in scientiﬁc publications revolving around
he question of the neural computations and networks that enable
s to share the feelings of others. As shown by a Pubmed search
f [“empathy” and (“brain” or “neural” or “neuroscience”)], per-
ormed on September 18, 2014, the handful of papers available in
004 have now increased to 1300 listed papers, with 2245 of these
apers published within the preceding year.
The goal of the present review is not, however, to provide an
xhaustive summary of what we have learned from these investi-
ations. For this, a correspondingly high number of recent reviews
re available (e.g. Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Decety et al., 2012;
eysers and Gazzola, 2014a; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Singer and
amm,  2009; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). Rather, in our extended
ommentary, we would like to put the spotlight on three issues
hat in our view currently encumber the ﬁeld of empathy research.
ur intention is not so much an in-depth scientiﬁc discourse on
hese issues, or to criticize the ﬁeld, since most likely most of our
olleagues are equally aware of them, or see them in a very simi-
ar way. Rather, we aim to provide some basis for a discussion on
ow to overcome some common misconceptions and their impli-
ations, targeting also science communicators and the interested
ublic who in their enthusiasm have at times misinterpreted and
iscommunicated the insights on empathy generated by social
euroscience.
The three issues we discuss are (a) the functional interpretation
f shared neural activations and what they tell us about the mech-
nisms of empathy; (b) the role of mirror neurons in empathy; and
c) the relationship of empathy with morality. In order to give some
ontext to our arguments, we ﬁrst brieﬂy summarize some of the
ain insights generated by the neuroscientiﬁc study of empathy.
. The neural networks involved in empathy
One of the major conceptual ﬁndings of Singer et al.’s “seed
tudy”, which was probably also one of the reasons it had such
 strong impact, was the observation that empathy recruits sim-
lar neural networks as the direct experience of the emotion one
s showing empathy for. Conﬁrming similar work in the domain
f disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), their study showed that the ante-
ior insular (AI) cortex and the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC
ccording to Vogt, 2005 but in some studies and in most initial
ork referred to as anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) were acti-
ated when observing the pain of others. This ﬁnding has since
een conﬁrmed by numerous subsequent studies, as documented
y image-based and coordinate-based meta-analyses which have
uantitatively integrated and summarized the available data (Fan
t al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011). Notably, AI and aMCC are part of the
o-called pain neuromatrix, the network of brain areas that is acti-
ated when one undergoes painful stimulation oneself (Derbyshire,
000). Resemblance between neural activity during direct emotion
xperiences and speciﬁc aspects of empathy (in particular motor
esonance, see discussion below) was also observed in studies
sing other methods, such as electroencephalography (EEG), motor
voked potential transcranial magnetic stimulation (MEP-TMS),
nd even presurgical intracranial electrophysiology (e.g. Avenanti
t al., 2005; Bufalari et al., 2007; Hutchison et al., 1999; Perry
t al., 2010). The similarity between neural activations for self- and
ther-related emotion experiences has motivated the interpreta-
ion that recruiting mental representations that normally underlie
irect emotion experiences is a central mechanism enabling empa-
hy and affective resonance. In other words, it has been suggestedce Research 90 (2015) 15–24
that we are able to understand and share the emotions of others
by (partially) processing them with our very own emotion sys-
tem(s). This has also fostered interpretations placing processes
such as simulation and self-projection at the core of empathy –
mechanisms of empathy that had already been proposed before
the availability of functional neuroimaging evidence (Gallese and
Goldman, 1998). Importantly, this view of empathy as a simula-
tive process did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was  inﬂuenced
by similar ﬁndings and interpretations in the motor domain, such
as the discovery of mirror neurons, and claims that these neurons,
which ﬁre both when the individual performs an action and when
it observes its execution by others, lie at the root of understanding
others’ actions (see Ferrari and Rizzolatti, 2014, for a recent review).
Similarly, in social cognition, simulation and self-projection have
been interpreted repeatedly as core mechanism of mentalizing,
i.e., considering others’ beliefs, intentions or thoughts (Goldman
and Sebanz, 2005; Mitchell, 2009). We  will critically discuss these
claims and the available evidence for it below.
2. Different mechanisms and neural routes to empathy
Empathy has come in (too) many different deﬁnitions and
descriptions – and this has certainly also infected the ﬁeld of social
neuroscience (see Batson, 2011, for an excellent overview). Yet, sev-
eral social neuroscientists have argued for a deﬁnition that requires
at least a partial, isomorphic sharing of the feeling(s) of another per-
son to be classiﬁed as empathy (e.g. Bernhardt and Singer, 2012;
Decety and Lamm,  2006; Decety et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Liencres
et al., 2013; Singer and Lamm, 2009). From the viewpoint of social
neuroscience, this interpretation is mainly based on the fact that
AI and MCC  are brain structures associated with the affective-
motivational aspects of pain, Outside of the domain of pain, these
areas are associated with functions strongly linked to emotional
experiences as well – such as conjoint interoception and homeo-
static regulation (Medford and Critchley, 2010). To understand the
neuro-psychological mechanisms of empathy, it is not sufﬁcient
to focus on its affective components, though. Indeed, numerous
investigations have consistently shown that motor and cognitive
functions play important roles in the instigation and modulation
of empathy. For instance, observing someone else getting his hand
jammed in a door or cutting his ﬁnger (Jackson et al., 2005, 2006),
getting an injection in his hand, or undergoing acupuncture (e.g.
Avenanti et al., 2005; Cheng et al., 2007; Lamm et al., 2007b;
Perry et al., 2010) has been shown to elicit “motor resonance”
processes, which in turn may  trigger the affective response to
the other’s pain. Notably, early but inﬂuential models of empa-
thy had already proposed the notion of a tight perception-action
coupling in the brain, and the automatic motor resonance result-
ing from it, as a core mechanism subserving empathy (Preston and
de Waal, 2002). Likewise, observing others being touched engages
our somatosensory system, seemingly enabling us to code the affec-
tive qualities of vicariously perceived touch (see Bufalari and Ionta,
2013; Keysers et al., 2010 for reviews). In the cognitive domain,
the ability to deliberately adopt the perspective of others and to
imagine their feelings, even without direct observation, can be an
equally potent instigator of affective responses (Jackson et al., 2006;
Lamm et al., 2007a) and ensuing prosocial behaviors (Hein et al.,
2010, 2011). This capacity has mainly been assigned to brain struc-
tures associated with theory of mind and mentalizing, such as the
medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and temporo-parietal junction
(e.g. Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), i.e., with processes that are primarily
engaged when reﬂecting on non-affective mental states of others.
These observations have led to the introduction of terms such
as motor empathy and cognitive empathy, pitting them against
affective empathy. However, it seems more useful in terms of
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onceptual clarity, and more in line with the deﬁnition of empathy
s a phenomenon of affective sharing, to see motor, somatosen-
ory and cognitive processes as key mechanisms (supported by
istinct neural pathways) of evoking an empathic response, rather
han as disparate components of the empathic response itself. For
nstance, we  have recently demonstrated that the same network
f AI and MCC  thought to underlie the affective component of
mpathy can be engaged by distinct “motor” and “cognitive” neu-
al routes (Lamm et al., 2011). While evoking affective empathic
esponses by means of pictures of another person’s body parts
n painful conditions recruited parietal and premotor structures
elated to action observation, showing participants abstract visual
ues that indicated the occurrence of painful electrical stimula-
ion engaged brain areas related to mentalizing and perspective
aking. This view does by no means devaluate the importance of
otor, somatosensory of cognitive pathways to empathy, or their
sefulness in theoretical models of it. Rather, it intends to avoid a
double assignment” of identical phenomena to distinct concepts.
or instance, with respect to “cognitive empathy”, distinguishing
ffective perspective taking (i.e., perspective taking to understand
ffect) from cognitive perspective taking (perspective taking to
nderstand cognition) seems much cleaner and more parsimonious
han calling the former “empathy” and the latter “theory of mind”
see also Sebastian et al., 2012; Singer, 2006).
. Three central but often misunderstood issues in the
euroscience of empathy
After this brief review, we would now like to discuss three in
ur view central issues that frequently come up when discussing
he neural mechanisms of empathy, and which are highly relevant
or our current understanding (or misunderstanding) of empathy.
.1. What do shared neural activations reﬂect?
As outlined above, there is compelling evidence that similar neu-
al structures are activated when empathizing with someone and
hen directly experiencing the emotion one is empathizing with.
owever, what role these shared activations play in empathy is
uch less obvious. The range of possible explanations parallels the
iversity of viewpoints in the debate on the functional role of mir-
or neurons that we will discuss in a later section (Csibra, 2008;
allese and Goldman, 1998; Hickok, 2009; Uithol et al., 2011). Just
s scientists have disagreed on whether mirror neuron responses
erve action understanding or reﬂect action understanding, affec-
ive neural responses, such as the activations in aMCC and AI during
mpathy for pain, could either be interpreted as a route to under-
tanding others’ feelings on a more elaborate level, or as a mere
ign of it. Although most scholars seem to have endorsed the ﬁrst
nterpretation, and we have positioned ourselves close to this camp
n the past as well (e.g., Lamm and Singer, 2010; Singer and Lamm,
009) we do not think that we have sufﬁcient evidence to unequiv-
cally decide between these two explanations, or any intermediate
ersion of them. Rather, we would like to emphasize the need for
aution in interpreting ﬁndings of shared neural activations in a
articular theoretical direction. In addition, we will outline below
ome of the factors that prevent a clear-cut interpretation of shared
ctivations, and discuss some ideas on how to possibly overcome
hese obstacles.
One obvious methodological limitation is that fMRI activations
hat overlap between two different conditions do not necessar-
ly imply that the same neural processes are engaged (e.g. see
rill-Spector and Malach, 2001). This limitation stems from both
he imprecision inherent to the hemodynamic response which
s only an indirect measure of neural activity, and the coarsece Research 90 (2015) 15–24 17
spatial resolution of fMRI, with each measurement voxel covering
thousands of neurons. These neuron populations might show a
different ﬁring and interaction pattern under different conditions,
but their net metabolic activity might be comparable, producing
hemodynamic responses that are indistinguishable with fMRI.
Similar limitations apply to other methods such as EEG (in partic-
ular for frequency-based analyses) and MEP-TMS, where different
neural inputs can create similar electrophysiological output, and
where measures are also based on mass neural activation and
not on ﬁring patterns of single neurons. These physiological and
methodological limitations are a hindrance to decide whether
shared neural activations imply shared emotion representations in
the strict (functional-psychological) sense of the term. One possible
remedy is to use more ﬁne-grained data acquisition in combination
with multivariate imaging analysis methods that operate on the
level of information rather than on the level of activations, as
classical univariate fMRI analyses do. For instance, multivariate
pattern analysis (MVPA) has recently been used to support claims
that directly experiencing pain and perceiving pain in others rely
on the same local activation patterns (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al.,
2011). This promising ﬁrst step however awaits independent con-
ﬁrmation and extension to approaches that incorporate different
types of pain, and a better control of domain-general aspects such
as salience (Valentini and Koch, 2012).
A related methodological issue is that methods such as fMRI,
EEG or MEP-TMS are correlational by nature (see e.g. Logothetis,
2008), and therefore only provide information on neural responses
co-occurring with the experience of empathy. In order to achieve
mechanistic interpretations, such as the one that shared activations
are a necessary condition for subjective experiences of empathy,
they need to be complemented by neuropsychological lesion stud-
ies or by neurostimulation studies, which provide more causal
evidence than correlational methods. An increasing number of neu-
ropsychological studies on empathy have recently been published
(for an excellent review see Hillis, 2014). However, their signiﬁ-
cance so far is limited by the fact that there are no patients with
circumscribed lesions of anterior insula and midcingulate cortex
only (or more generally speaking of areas speciﬁcally related to
distinct emotions and empathy alike), and by the fact that many
studies were based on either self-report measures of trait empa-
thy, or used experimental paradigms whose dependent variables
captured processes other than empathy in the sense of affect shar-
ing. Future studies are therefore needed that bridge the ﬁelds
of neuropsychology with social neuroscience more exhaustively.
Nevertheless, recent research has yielded some promising causal
evidence, for instance, data suggesting that damage to the ante-
rior insula results in reduced affective perspective taking (e.g. Leigh
et al., 2013). As for neurostimulation in healthy volunteers, there
are currently no methods available that convincingly allow non-
invasive stimulation of structures such as aMCC and AI, which are
located deeply under the cortical mantle. However, there is an
increasing number of tDCS and TMS  studies targeting motor, cog-
nitive or sensory processes related to empathy or playing a part
in triggering it (e.g. Catmur et al., 2011; Hetu et al., 2012; Lev-Ran
et al., 2012; Santiesteban et al., 2012). Recently, we  also used TMS
of the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) to disrupt self-other dis-
tinction, and could demonstrate that this results in egocentrically
biased empathic judgments (Silani et al., 2013). Whether this effect
is limited to judgments or also extends to a decrease of affect shar-
ing still needs to be shown though, and is currently investigated
by our group (see also Tomova et al., 2014). We are therefore opti-
mistic that future studies will continue to expand our knowledge
on causal mechanisms. Moreover, an increasing number of devel-
opmental social neuroscience studies started to tap into causality
questions by exploiting the fact that some areas of the brain related
to empathy show changes in functionality over the lifespan. For
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nstance, Steinbeis and colleagues were able to demonstrate that
ge-related differences in function and structure of the rSMG pre-
ict differences in overcoming egocentric empathic bias in children
s. adults. Interestingly, this study also showed higher activation in
nterior insula (as an indication of affect sharing) in adults, whose
SMG was fully developed (Steinbeis et al., 2014).
A further limitation in addressing the role of shared activa-
ions is the fact that the vast majority of studies have investigated
mpathy for negative affect, and in particular pain. This prevents
esting one of the central predictions of the simulative shared rep-
esentations account: If vicarious activation of the neural networks
nvolved in the direct experience of a certain emotion really reﬂects
mpathic sharing of the other person’s affect, then different net-
orks should be engaged when empathizing with emotions that
re represented differently on this level. For instance, empathiz-
ng with positive emotions such as joy and happiness should
esult in activation in structures engaged during the direct expe-
ience of positive affect, such as the ventral striatum and the
edial orbitofrontal cortex. Furthermore, different activation pat-
erns should also emerge when empathizing with different types
f emotions, analogous to the activation differences related to
he ﬁrst-person experience of those emotions. Unfortunately, only
ew studies compared different emotions or emotions of differing
alence within one design, and they produced mixed results. For
nstance, Perry et al. investigated empathy for distress and for joy
Perry et al., 2012), and observed largely overlapping activation
atterns to these different emotions, both including the insular
ortex and medial prefrontal cortex. However, activations were
ore pronounced when empathizing with distress rather than
oy. On the other hand, Morelli et al. (2014) who  used a com-
ination of contextual descriptions and pictorial presentations of
thers’ pain, anxiety or happiness showed that while pain and
nxiety engaged bilateral aIns and aMCC, happiness activated the
entromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Only recently we  were
ble to conﬁrm and extend these ﬁndings (Lamm et al., submitted
or publication). Using an experimental paradigm which induced
leasant and unpleasant affective states in participants by means
f visuo-tactile stimulation, and then asking them to empathize
ith another person undergoing the same types of stimulation,
e showed that sharing pleasant touch recruits a different net-
ork than sharing unpleasant touch. Speciﬁcally, empathizing with
leasant touch and directly experiencing it activated the medial
rbitofrontal cortex, while directly and vicariously experienced
npleasant touch activated the anterior insula. Hence, one of the
ain preconditions of a simulative explanation seems to be sup-
orted: the vicarious engagement of distinct neural networks for
motions of different valence, paralleling the networks related to
he self-related experience of these emotions. On the other hand,
e should bear in mind a further major limitation, namely that our
rain organization might not respect the commonsense categories
hat we have devised for our emotions; rather, different emotions
eem to be subserved by broadly distributed, largely overlapping
unctional networks that might be involved in a range of further
motional or non-emotional mental states (Lindquist and Barrett,
012).
Finally, another issue that makes it hard to decide how to func-
ionally interpret shared activations is the distinction between
elf-centered and other-oriented responses. More speciﬁcally, as
ighlighted already a long time ago by social psychologists, wit-
essing the suffering of others can trigger both a self-oriented
personal distress” response, and an other-oriented “empathic con-
ern” response (e.g. Batson et al., 1987). To complicate things,
ithin the latter concept, another distinction to be made is the
ne between empathy in the sense of “feeling as” another person
i.e. representing her feelings as if they were our own), and “feel-
ng for” her, which is an empathic (concern) response more akince Research 90 (2015) 15–24
to concepts such as sympathy, compassion, or care for the other
(see Batson, 2011; Singer and Lamm,  2009 for a differentiation
between these terms). Hence, activation in the anterior insula or
the MCC  when witnessing the pain of others might be related to
any of these three phenomena. To personal distress, because see-
ing someone else suffer causes an aversive response resulting in
increased autonomic arousal and withdrawal motivations, whose
bodily concomitants are interocepted in the anterior insula, and
homeostatically regulated in the MCC  (see Craig, 2009; Medford
and Critchley, 2010 for reviews). To empathy in the sense of “feel-
ing as”, because we  “replicate” the other’s neural activation of these
structures related to the affective-motivational component of pain.
And to empathic concern as “feeling for” because the activations
might also be related to a salient motivation to relieve the suf-
fering of the other person, stemming either from the vicarious
“feeling as” emotional response, or from a cognitive evaluation of
the other’s state and how one should act upon it. Notably, these
phenomena are not mutually exclusive but will in real life occur
conjointly, implying that the neural responses in these brain areas
are probably a “mixed bag”, which makes it difﬁcult to identify
which activity is related to which psychological phenomenon. Not
surprisingly, then, the available evidence to address these distinc-
tions has produced inconclusive results. For instance, correlations
with trait and state measures of empathic concern and personal
distress have been extremely volatile. While some early studies
demonstrate that AI activation correlates with empathic concern,
though only when using rather liberal statistical thresholds (e.g.
Lamm et al., 2007a; Singer et al., 2004, 2006), others have failed to
replicate this (see review in Lamm et al., 2011), or report correla-
tions for personal distress only (Cheetham et al., 2009). Moreover,
perspective taking manipulations aimed at selectively amplifying
feelings of personal distress or empathic concern resulted either
in comparable responses to the two  in the anterior insula but a
stronger response in middle insula for personal distress (Lamm
et al., 2007a), or stronger responses in the anterior insula and the
MCC with higher personal distress (Jackson et al., 2006). More
recently however, an interventional study has demonstrated dif-
ferences in responses between participants who  had trained to
“empathize with” the suffering of others (without regulating their
negative affect) and those who had trained to “show compassion
for” them (with affect regulation) (Klimecki et al., 2014). While the
former type of training probably resulted in empathic responses in
the sense of “feeling as” and increased personal distress, the lat-
ter likely engaged processes related to “feeling for” and empathic
concern to a stronger extent. Interestingly, differences in positive
and negative affect and distinct neural activation patterns are in
line with these predictions. Empathy training resulted in higher
negative affect and engaged AI and MCC  in those subdivisions meta-
analytically identiﬁed and referred to throughout the present paper
as related to empathy. Compassion training in contrast resulted in
relatively higher positive affect and increased activation in areas
associated with positive affect. This would therefore speak for an
interpretation of the activation in AI and MCC  that is consistently
found in studies on empathy as reﬂecting “feeling as”, which is in
line with a shared representation account. Nevertheless, from the
perspective of the suffering person, the “positive affect” response
induced by compassion might be the better option, as compassion
strongly motivates helping behavior while empathy in some cases
doesn’t (see also below, and Zanon et al., 2014, for a recent ele-
gant demonstration using a life-threatening virtual reality scenario,
showing that stronger engagement of AI results in less helping
behavior).Summing up, the empirical phenomenon of shared neural
activations during direct and vicarious emotion experiences is a
very clear and robust one. What is much less clear is its func-
tional interpretation, with conceptual issues and methodological
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nd empirical limitations obstructing a clearer view. Future
tudies, including both theoretical approaches and new empir-
cal directions, some of which we have outlined above, are
herefore needed to enable a better integration of neural and
onceptual–psychological levels of description.
.2. What role do mirror neurons play in empathy?
In public talks or discussions with the media on the social neu-
oscience of empathy the term mirror neurons almost inevitably
omes up – mostly referring to the presumed role of these neu-
ons as the elementary building blocks or precondition of empathy.
irror neurons are certainly among the most fascinating neurosci-
ntiﬁc discoveries of the last decades. The ﬁnding in the beginning
f the 90s (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti
t al., 1996) that there are neurons in the macaque brain that selec-
ively ﬁre both when the monkey is executing an action and when
t is merely observing its execution by others was  groundbreaking:
t showed for the ﬁrst time that actions can be coded by individ-
al neurons on a level that generalizes across motor and sensory
omains and across different actors (see Ferrari and Rizzolatti, 2014
or review and historical account). As such it provided a common
epresentational space for actions of one self and of others, and
hus a fascinating possible neural implementation of “making sense
f” observed actions by internally simulating them. According to
nﬂuential views, automatically mirroring others’ movements with
ur mirror neurons would allow us to subsequently retrieve the
ntentions that gave rise to them, thus forming the key to under-
tanding what was going on in others’ minds (e.g. Gallese and
oldman, 1998). Some years later, the ﬁrst studies (as reviewed
bove) showing that processing one’s own emotions and empathiz-
ng with those of others induced activation changes in overlapping
reas, suggested that making sense of others’ feelings also involves
imulation processes.
It was tempting to conclude, then, that mirror neurons are the
ery reason why we can empathize with others – being the lit-
le work horses that pull the carriage of our empathic abilities.
oreover, the presence of mirror neurons in monkeys seemed
o suggest that their function is “hard-wired”, leading to sugges-
ions that we are predetermined to resonate with the emotions
f others “because of our mirror neurons”. The prevalence of such
ssumptions in the public reception and media discourse has cer-
ainly been fueled by some rather uncritical popular science books
Bauer, 2006; Ramachandran, 2011), but also by early publications
f scholars in the ﬁeld of social neuroscience who linked the two
henomena quite liberally, but without much hard evidence. Yet,
uch a view is problematic in several ways: on the one hand, it
acks empirical support or even contradicts it; on the other, it has
road but misleading implications for our general understanding
f empathy.
A ﬁrst problem with the assumption that mirror neurons under-
ie empathy is that is lacks direct empirical support. A limited
umber of studies on mirror neurons have shown that certain types
f neurons in the premotor and parietal areas in macaques respond
o both the sight and the execution of (usually hand) actions; yet,
here is no evidence that these neurons also play a role in evok-
ng emotional responses in the monkey in response to the sight
f emotional expressions in others. In addition, the ﬁndings of
ingle-cell recordings in monkeys cannot be that easily transferred
o humans, where we cannot perform such experiments. Instead,
e need to rely on evidence from indirect and imprecise mea-
ures, including neuroimaging methods, studies combining TMS
ith motor evoked potentials (MEP), or electroencephalographic
easures of sensorimotor “resonance”. More recently, it could
owever be demonstrated using intracortical recordings that neu-
ons with mirror neuron properties also seem to exist in humansce Research 90 (2015) 15–24 19
(Mukamel et al., 2010). Surprisingly though, such neurons were not
only found in “classical” motor areas, but also in e.g. the entorhinal
and parahippocampal areas. Nevertheless, when studying healthy
volunteers, we  can only speak of common activation on the level
of brain areas or aggregate electrical signals, not on the level of
individual neurons. As a result, the term “mirror neurons” should
be used with caution if applied to humans. More importantly, it
needs to be clear that they are a “motor” phenomenon by their
very deﬁnition.
Even if one assumes that mirror neurons are present in humans
and are also involved in coding emotional expressions, ascribing
a causal role in higher-order “interpretative” functions to them,
whether it is understanding intentions or affective states, is prob-
lematic. Although mirror neurons have been shown to code very
speciﬁc features of actions, some on the level of kinematics, some
on a broader goal level, this does not necessarily imply that these
neurons are involved in “copying” these aspects from the observed
behavior by directly transforming visual input into motor code
(as the term “mirroring” seems to suggest). In fact, such bottom-
up “mirroring” of goal properties is implausible since there is
no one-to-one mapping of perceived movements and the goals
associated with them. In general, it seems unlikely that mirror neu-
ron responses serve as input to contribute to high-level intention
understanding (Csibra, 2008; Hickok, 2009; Uithol et al., 2011). In
fact, more recent accounts of their function assume a reverse pro-
cess: that observed actions are “interpreted” in other brain areas,
and that mirror neuron responses constitute a top-down generated,
predictive simulation that is used to facilitate ongoing percep-
tion (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005) – and thus reﬂects rather than
contributes to action understanding (Csibra, 2008). Given these
considerations, the view that mirror neurons enable us to under-
stand others’ feelings in a bottom-up fashion seems untenable, too.
This does not mean though that motor resonance processes can-
not have a role in empathy. As outlined above, different pathways
and mechanisms can trigger emotion resonance and the observa-
tion of actions that have emotional consequences for the actor is
certainly one of them. For instance, as already shown by early work
(Jackson et al., 2005), seeing others touching a hot stove or cutting
their ﬁnger with a kitchen knife activates brain areas related to
affective processing, including the MCC  and AI. Importantly, how-
ever, these stimuli also activated parts of the inferior parietal cortex
and ventral premotor cortex that would classically be assigned to
the “mirror neuron system” (see Lamm et al., 2011, for recent meta-
analytic integration). It therefore seems plausible that the “action
observation” aspect of these paradigms resulted in (sensori-)motor
resonance, which in turn might have facilitated emotion resonance.
However, it is important to stress that this does not mean that
motor resonance alone can “explain” or is synonymous with the
emotion resonance. Rather, it might be a starting point that inter-
acts with and needs to be supplemented by additional mechanisms,
foremost affective resonance.
Further research on the links between motor resonance and
empathic responses indicates that motor resonance does not seem
to be a necessary condition for empathy. That is, empathy often
occurs without the involvement of brain areas associated with mir-
ror neurons in monkeys. For one, there are many situations in which
empathic responses are evoked, without an action or even a person
being perceived. For instance, simply reading in a novel or news-
paper about the joy or plight of others, may elicit strong empathic
sentiments. Although one could argue that these responses might
be caused by imagining the other person’s body by way of motor
resonance processes, the available evidence indicates otherwise:
for instance, learning that another person is in pain by means of
an abstract visual cue (such as in Singer et al.’s seminal approach)
rather than a pictorial presentation, does not activate “motor reso-
nance areas”, but areas related to mentalizing and theory of mind
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Riecˇansky´ et al., EPub ahead of print; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2013;
Sheng and Han, 2012; Sheng et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2009). Apart from
ethnicity, factors such as one’s attitude toward the other person, or
1 Note that although the term “racial” has been mostly used in previous work, we
prefer to use the term “ethnicity” as a more accurate and appropriate description0 C. Lamm, J. Majdandzˇic´ / Neur
again, see Lamm et al., 2011, for a meta-analysis). Of course,
ndings based on fMRI cannot be seen as conclusive in this regard,
ut even if motor resonance is shown with seemingly more direct
easures, such as suppression of mu  rhythm in EEG signal over cen-
ral areas, this does not necessarily reﬂect motor mirroring but may
nstead represent coding of other properties, e.g. tactile features, of
bserved actions (Coll et al., 2014).
Further support that automatic motor resonance is not a pre-
equisite for empathy comes from the arguments presented above
hat there are obviously many routes to trigger empathy. This
learly challenges the (naïve, yet in the general public widely held)
ssumption that mirror neurons are prerequisites for empathy.
esearch on clinical populations also speaks against this assump-
ion, including the recently highlighted distinction between the
ropensity and the ability for empathy, shown in individuals
ith psychopathy who did not activate empathy “automatically”,
ut were able to activate empathic responses when explicitly
nstructed to do so (Meffert et al., 2013). This is inconsistent with
 view of empathy being dependent on bottom-up signaling from
irror neurons. Moreover, patients with congenital insensitivity
o pain who lack the action-to-pain associations present in healthy
ersons are nevertheless able to experience empathic responses in
esponse to the sight of actions which are painful for the actors.
his demonstrates, obviously, that empathy can also be generated
y mentalizing or associate learning mechanisms, rather than being
olely dependent on motor resonance (Danziger et al., 2006, 2009).
In addition to not being necessary for empathy, “mirror neurons”
o not seem to be sufﬁcient for accurate empathy either. There are
everal cases in which relying on automatic motor resonance pro-
esses would lead to inaccurate empathic responses, such as when
eing exposed to people whose sensorimotor affective mapping
iffers from our own. We  have addressed this aspect in a series of
xperiments in which we  exposed participants to situations that
ould be painful for themselves, but are in fact not painful for the
bserved other. The consistent ﬁnding of these studies is that neural
esponses related to action observation are relatively unaffected by
his manipulation (probably indicating that automatic motor reso-
ance are relatively robust to such manipulations) while emotional
esponses are strongly modiﬁed, suggesting that mechanisms other
han motor resonance mediate the empathic response and its reg-
lation (Lamm et al., 2007b, 2010; Perry et al., 2010).
Taken together, both theoretical considerations and empirical
vidence suggest that empathy neither requires, nor can be exhaus-
ively explained by a “mirror neuron” faculty. In our opinion it
s crucial to take a more judicious viewpoint here – both within
he scientiﬁc community and in communication with the popu-
ar media. Not only is the assumption that mirror neurons are the
nderpinnings of empathy an incorrect one; the implications from
uch a view are also undesirable. For instance, possibly due to the
ell-deﬁned properties of mirror neurons studied in macaques,
t is often presumed that mirror neurons are hard-wired in their
ensorimotor couplings, and that responses of mirror neurons are
nduced in an automatic, inﬂexible fashion. These presumptions
re incorrect if applied to mirror neurons (which seem to be highly
alleable by learning processes, see Cook et al., 2014; Heyes, 2010,
or recent in-depth review) and therefore lead to equally false
ssertions if applied to the construct of empathy – for example,
hat we have a biologically hard-wired predisposition to automati-
ally respond empathically to others. While the view that there are
trong evolutionary roots and forces of automaticity in empathic
esponding certainly is valid (see also de Waal, 2008; Decety et al.,
012; Decety and Svetlova, 2012 for recent comparative and devel-
pmental reviews), it seems more likely that the automaticity and
pparent predisposition for empathic resonance can be attributed
o (early) learning experiences, culture and socialization rather
han to hard-wired mirroring. This argument is also supportedce Research 90 (2015) 15–24
by a plethora of studies documenting the strong malleability of
empathy by a variety of situational factors, including the relation-
ship between people, the situational context, or the appraisal of a
situation (e.g. Engen and Singer, 2013; Hein and Singer, 2008 for
reviews focusing on modulation of empathy).
In sum, use of the term “mirroring” might be helpful as a loose
analogy for the process of “reproducing” the affective experiences
of others in our own emotion-related neural systems. However,
we need to be aware that this is not the same as presuming that
empathic abilities are causally linked to mirror neurons. Not only
is this view empirically incorrect; it might also have broader, neg-
ative scientiﬁc and practical implications for our understanding of
empathy.
3.3. Does increasing empathy make us “better people”?
In the public but at times also in the academic discourse, it
appears to be taken for granted that empathy can act as a rem-
edy or a stronghold against anti-social phenomena which seem
to affect our society to an increasing extent – such as the self-
ish greed in the ﬁnancial industry supposedly contributing to the
global ﬁnancial crisis, or the many armed conﬂicts we are witness-
ing these days, ranging from Syria over the Ukraine to Gaza. For
instance, US-president Barack Obama has repeatedly spoken of an
empathy deﬁcit in our modern society, and stated that an “empathy
crisis” may  be at the root of the economic and political crises we
are experiencing (2006, June 19). Such views have certainly been
inﬂuenced by the folk intuition that empathy motivates prosocial
behavior, such as helping others in need. Indeed, this intuition has
received widespread support from social psychology (see Batson,
1991), as well as more recently from the ﬁeld of social neuroscience.
For instance, Hein et al. (2010) demonstrated that individual dif-
ferences in altruistic behavior (taking over painful shocks from
another person) were predicted by activation of empathy-related
neural responses in left anterior insula (see also Hein et al., 2011;
Masten et al., 2011; Mathur et al., 2010). At ﬁrst glance, such a link
between empathy and altruism might imply that increasing empa-
thy in our society will reduce egoism and selﬁshness and the social
conﬂicts associated with them (Rifkin, 2010).
However, such propositions overlook the fact that empathy is
sensitive to deeply-rooted parochialism and ingroup bias (see Chiao
and Mathur, 2010). This implies that it will motivate altruistic
action in a way that prefers to help or cooperate with persons
and groups that we perceive as closer or more similar to us.
For instance, evidence for ethnicity1 bias – a phenomenon char-
acterizing the more negative perception of or behavior toward
members of an ethnic outgroup – abounds in the social psy-
chological literature. Recently, the ﬁelds of social and of cultural
neuroscience have begun to document and understand the neuro-
biological bases of such bias in the domain of empathy. For instance,
there is substantial and consistent evidence stemming from a vari-
ety of experimental approaches and neuroscientiﬁc methods that
humans show reduced neural responses to pain being inﬂicted on
ethnic outgroup members (e.g. Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al.,
2013; Contreras-Huerta et al., 2013; Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2012;of  the phenomenon we are dealing with – i.e., differences between individuals in
socio-cultural and physical, but not in biological-genetic terms. Moreover, this also
intends to avoid the deterministic connotations of the term race, a concept that is
still used in a derogatory way and to justify exploitative treatment of members of
“inferior races” (AAPA, 1996).
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hether one is in a competitive vs. cooperative relationship with
er, also seem sufﬁcient to cause an almost complete blockage of
mpathic responses and can even cause anti-social responses such
s counter-empathy and Schadenfreude (Decety et al., 2010; Singer
t al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009; Yamada et al., 2011).
It is important to note that these empathy biases also directly
nﬂuence biases in altruistic behavior. For instance, both the studies
f Hein et al. (2010) and of Mathur et al. (2010) cited above demon-
trate higher altruistic helping for ingroup members, and this was
otivated by different aspects of empathy. More speciﬁcally, foot-
all fans were more likely to share the pain of fans of their team,
s compared to fans of their “enemy” team (Hein et al., 2010), and
his difference in empathy as measured by activation differences in
he anterior insula predicted a higher proportion of painful shocks
aken over from fellow team fans. Similarly, members of different
thnic groups rather supported members of their own group than
f other groups, and this was linked to higher activation of medial
refrontal cortical areas, which the authors interpreted as higher
ognitive empathy (Mathur et al., 2010; in line with our discussion
bove, though, we suggest to avoid this term in favor of explaining
he group differences as linked to a higher degree of mentalizing or
erspective taking).
Interestingly, biased prosocial behavior can also be induced by
ubtle manipulations of interpersonal perception and connection.
e have recently documented that the simple act of thinking about
he mental states of another person predicts biased decisions dur-
ng subsequent ﬁctitious moral dilemmas (Majdandzic et al., 2012).
ore speciﬁcally, persons whose mental states had been reﬂected
pon were sacriﬁced less often in scenarios requiring to sacriﬁce
heir life to prevent casualties in a greater number of others. This
ecision bias was therefore acting against the moral principles of
tilitarianism, which proposes that one ought to act in a way  that
aximizes the net social welfare (West, 2013), as well as against
he moral principle to treat all people equally (McKerlie, 2013).
hese moral decisions could be explained by a higher degree of
onnectedness to and “humanization” of the persons whose men-
al states one had previously considered, as compared to persons
ho had not been mentalized with. On a neural level, decisions con-
erning humanized persons were associated with higher activation
n brain structures related to mentalizing, empathy/affect sharing,
nd emotion regulation. The fact that a higher degree of vicari-
us emotions caused a higher degree of sparing the humanized
erson was also conﬁrmed by an independent behavioral experi-
ent. It therefore seems that the biased decisions were triggered
y processes related to both empathy and affective sharing, as
ell as to more cognitive aspects such as taking the other per-
on’s perspective which might have induced a higher degree of
mpathy.
The latter study also highlights another important aspect in dis-
ussing the links between empathy and morality. That is, some
oral rules, like the principle not to harm others, might oppose
ther ones, like the principle of treating all people equally, or of
aximizing the ratio of beneﬁt and harm for all people, as in util-
tarianism. Empathic sentiments toward certain persons making
t less likely for someone to harm them might therefore, under
ertain circumstances, lead to amoral decisions with respect to
ther principles, and inﬂict “collateral” damage on other individu-
ls or groups of people (see also Decety and Cowell, 2014; Ugazio
t al., 2014, for a more extensive discussion of this aspect). This
lso suggests that persons with lower state or trait empathic con-
ern will more easily adhere to the “rational” moral principle of
tilitarianism and of treating all people equally, which was  indeed
onﬁrmed by a recent behavioral study (Gleichgerrcht and Young,
013). Interestingly, these ﬁndings might be mediated by indi-
idual differences in alexithymia, i.e. the inability to identify and
escribe one’s own emotions (Patil and Silani, 2014); hence, suchce Research 90 (2015) 15–24 21
biased responding might be overcome by inducing a higher degree
of emotional arousal (Patil et al., 2014).
Thus, increases in empathy do not necessarily make us behave
more “morally”, nor does moral behavior seem to require empathic
responses as a motivation or precondition (Proctor, 2005). A fur-
ther illustration of the latter idea comes from ﬁndings showing that
although moral dilemmas often activate areas related to affective
processing (Greene and Haidt, 2002), moral decisions based on a
sense of justice recruit a markedly distinct network involving areas
involved in higher-order cognition (e.g. the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; Yoder and Decety, 2014). This further conﬁrms the notion
that moral decision making can operate outside the inﬂuence of
empathy.
Finally, we  need to consider that people may  be able to
empathize with others (in the sense of being able to feel what
they are feeling, or “feeling as”) and still harm them. The “tools
of empathy” or knowledge about them at times may  even be delib-
erately exploited to inﬂict harm in others, for instance in persons
with psychopathic personality traits. Only recently, a series of social
neuroscience studies has added to our knowledge of the psycho-
pathic mind and how he or she is able to engage in such a-moral
or a-social behavior. Interestingly, these studies suggest that psy-
chopaths seem to show a lower propensity for empathy (in the
sense of affect sharing), yet are able to feel what others are feel-
ing when explicitly instructed to do so – though the exact way in
which this instructing should be devised is still somewhat contro-
versial, with different studies yielding somewhat different results
(Decety et al., 2013a, 2013b; Keysers and Gazzola, 2014b for review;
Lockwood et al., 2013a, 2014; Meffert et al., 2013; Pfabigan et al.,
2014). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the capacity to fully
(and possibly empathically) sense the effects of one’s actions, but to
deliberately modify one’s behavioral response to it can be exploited
to do harm rather than to increase the welfare of others. This is illus-
trated in a horrendous way by case of Norwegian mass murderer
Anders Breivik, who  allegedly stated that “he was fully capable of
empathy but had used a “meditation technique” to override his
feelings” (Honigsbaum, 2013). Moreover, adolescents with aggres-
sive conduct disorder seem to produce vicarious distress responses
to the suffering of others (Decety et al., 2009; but see Lockwood
et al., 2013b for conﬂicting results) suggesting that they might
sense the distress of others but nevertheless engage in antiso-
cial behavior. This is possibly due to the development of effective
strategies to down-regulate these responses under certain circum-
stances, or, in more extreme cases, due to the pleasurable effects of
doing harm (Baumeister and Campbell, 1999). Unfortunately, we
do not have to go all the way  to psychopathy to illustrate how
empathy can be exploited for one’s own  and not for the greater
good. For instance, we  probably all know competitive situations,
such as in sports, in which team tactics exploit our knowledge of
how our opponents will feel and act in response to certain actions
(such as the “psychological warfare” that might be applied dur-
ing penalties shots in football), or conﬂicts with friends or loved
ones in which our enhanced ability to empathize with them may
provide us with all the more effective tools to hurt their feelings.
Conversely, the potentially undesired consequences of upregulat-
ing one’s empathic “gut” sentiments are illustrated by reports of
“American mothers to feel sorry” for Boston Marathon bomber
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, allegedly because of pictures showing him with
a “cute” and innocent face (Bloom, 2013).
Summing up, the available social psychological and social neu-
roscience evidence suggests that social decisions and behaviors
driven by empathy will often be parochially biased, and that obser-
vations of these behavioral biases are paralleled by biases in the
neurobiological processes thought to underlie empathy. Parochial-
ism also seems to have strong phylogenetic roots, which motivate
us to prefer and show maximum care for close kin, such as our own
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ffspring (Decety, 2011). As a consequence, initiatives simplisti-
ally aimed at a generalized increase of empathic sensitivity will
ikely not promote a more impartial society. Rather, it will likely
eplace egoism by its twin brother: an ingroup-favoring type of
ltruism – thereby widening rather than diminishing the bound-
ries between social groups.
Instead of training people to blindly rely on an ampliﬁcation of
mpathy, attempts at enhancing impartiality of prosocial attitudes
nd actions in our society need to be tailored to include individuals
hat fall outside of our preferred social groups. This is indeed the
pproach on which many ancient spiritual techniques have built
p on. For instance, Buddhist Metta¯ (Loving Kindness) meditation
s aimed at overcoming our deeply rooted parochial preferences by
sing speciﬁc mental exercises akin to perspective taking, in order
o help us expand our compassion to all sentient beings, includ-
ng our adversaries. The ﬁeld of contemplative neuroscience has
ecently begun to understand the neural and biological mecha-
isms of such approaches, with promising ﬁrst results indicating
hat expanding our circle of “close others” not only has positive
ffects on how we perceive and interact with others, but also on our
wn well-being and affect (Klimecki et al., 2013, 2014; Leiberg et al.,
011; Weng et al., 2013). This might, then, be the trick president
bama has been looking for: a win-win situation that improves not
nly social welfare, but also our own wellbeing, by making us act in
 more compassionate way toward all beings, including ourselves.
. Conclusions
The intention of our review was to highlight some key issues rel-
vant to our understanding of the phenomenon of empathy and the
eural mechanisms supporting this complex and important social
kill. The signiﬁcance of these issues partly stems from the fact that
hey are intimately related to empathy and as such are keenly dis-
ussed in the public discourse, but at the same time due to their
omplexity might seriously obscure our insights into this topic.
or instance, an overly enthusiastic tendency to interpret shared
eural activations in a certain functional direction, to causally link
mpathy to our presumed mirror neuron system, or to assume that
 move toward relying onto our empathic “gut” sentiments will
ake our society more prosocial, all seem to be popular outcomes
f our increased scientiﬁc knowledge on empathy but might actu-
lly make us drift away from the facts. Therefore we would like
o encourage researchers to more explicitly separate neural and
onceptual–psychological levels of descriptions in their discussions
f empathy, in order to avoid misinterpretation of the concept.
lso, researchers as well as science communicators should take
fforts to clearly articulate the interpretational limitations of their
mpirical work. And furthermore, care should be taken to apply
oncepts related to empathy more distinctively and appropriately
e.g., “affective”, “motor”, and “cognitive” empathy).
The aim of this review and commentary was to provide a foun-
ation on which the ﬁeld of social neuroscience and the interested
ublic alike can critically evaluate the current understanding of
mpathy, and by which new directions may  be inspired. These
irections, include, for instance, the development of more rig-
rous experimental paradigms, (causal) research methods and
heoretical models to (1) substantiate the notion of shared neu-
al activations accounts and assess how they are causally related to
ehavioral manifestations of empathy; (2) clarify how motor reso-
ance shapes and predicts affective responses and to what extent
his enables affective understanding; (3) investigate the speciﬁcity
f emotion sharing and its consequences by combining and cross-
lassifying different emotions within the same paradigm and (4)
xamine clinical populations with speciﬁc deﬁcits. After all, the
eld of social neuroscience and in particular the investigation ofce Research 90 (2015) 15–24
empathy is still very young, and the latter has not even reached its
adolescence yet. Having had such a promising and eager childhood,
though, it seem reasonable to expect that with further aging, we
will develop more elaborate theoretical models and more rigorous
empirical tools to ultimately gain more conclusive insights.
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